PROMESA, Puerto Rico and the American Empire
When President Barak Obama signed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) he reignited a debate on Puerto Rico's role within the American empire that had been publicly dormant for years. PROMESA became law soon after the Puerto Rican government announced it could not pay down a $74 billion debt obligation to investors holding Puerto Rican municipal bonds. This landmark legislation established a Financial and Management Oversight Board for Puerto Rico (FMOB) , "to provide a method for a covered territory to achieve fiscal responsibility and access to capital markets" (Public Law 114-187 2016) .
PROMESA is a watershed moment because it marks Puerto Rico's diminished, if not inconsequential, role in the American empire. Although the financial crisis was the proximate cause that prompted Congress to enact PROMESA, two changes in U.S. policy set the context for its current financial debacle. By the mid-1990s Puerto Rico's strategic significance for the U.S. had virtually evaporated, and its standing as an internationally competitive investment site for U.S. corporations was vastly diminished. In the context of these consequential changes, the Clinton and Bush administrations demilitarized Puerto Rico (See Ruiz-Marrero 2002) , and terminated a federal tax law that was the foundation of Puerto Rico's industrialization by invitation program. These two policy changes contributed to a dramatic decline in external investments. This in turn caused the insular government to adopt risky economic policies to generate external capital flows, most prominently increased reliance on the sale of municipal bonds to finance government operations.
In this essay I discuss America's ascension to hyper-power status, how this contributed to changes in U.S. colonial policy, and the impact of the changes on Puerto Rico's political economy. Second, I show that PROMESA was a legal instrument devised by the federal government to deprive the insular administration of authority to manage Puerto Rico's political economy. I then look at the contradictory properties of colonialism that simultaneously promote and deter capitalist development. I also discuss how the FMOB's capacity to restore Puerto Rico to positive economic growth is undermined by colonialism. The article concludes with comments on Puerto Rico's unprecedented outmigration that began in 2006 as Puerto Rico descended into a long recession. Hurricane Maria, which struck Puerto Rico in September 2017, made an already deplorable situation worse. The exodus of Puerto Ricans, which accelerated after the hurricane ravished the economy, imperils the island's economic recovery.
Puerto Rico in a Unipolar World
Colonies are constitutive of empires; they are sources of raw materials and captive markets for manufactured commodities from the metropolis, they can be a repository for the metropolis's surplus labor (for example European settler colonies, or military occupation) or they can serve as sources of imported cheap labor for the colonial power (Puerto Rican case). But, ultimately a colony is expected to generate wealth for the colonizer. Colonies are also military and strategic assets that are deployed to project the empire's power and to expand its territorial reach. From the dawn of the Progressive Era through what may be the beginning of the end of the American Century Puerto Rico fulfilled these functions as a colony of the United States (Stengel 2017 , Mason 2009 ). However, during the last two decades Puerto Rico's strategic and Months before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, British journalist Peregrine Worsthorne, observed, "there are now no longer two superpowers. There is one hyper-power with all the rest far behind" (Brands 2016) . The era of superpower conflict for global supremacy had come to an end.
Charles Krauthammer referred to this era as the "unipolar moment for the United States" (Krauthammer 1990 (Krauthammer /1991 . In the post Cold War unipolar period the "United States possessed multiple and mutually reinforcing dimensions of dominance" that made it a formidable power, if not dominant power (Brands 2016, 11) . In his 1993 State of Union address President Clinton alerted the nation to this new status. He announced, "We are the world's only superpower," and called for reduction in military spending given America's unrivalled supremacy.
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An array of factors precipitated the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but the onset of globalization appears to have been particularly salient (Lockwood 2000) . The Soviet Union was an ossified and anachronistic regime whose centrally planned economy was utterly incapable of adjusting to the dizzying technological advances and swift pace of globalization. In contrast, the United States was in the forefront of a global restructuring of capitalist production relations. Not surprisingly globalization had adverse consequences for Puerto Rico's vulnerable economy.
Puerto Rico had served important strategic and ideological functions during the Cold War period, and it had figured prominently in the investment strategies of different sectors of American capital. But Puerto Rico's well-defined and seemingly fixed status within the American empire quickly and unexpectedly unraveled as the United States assumed a new status in the international economic and political order. Puerto Rico's export-led manufacturing strategy, which was dependent on U.S. capital and U.S. markets, became economically unsustainable in the era of globalization and intensified international trade. Puerto Rico's strategic function in advancing and included a live fire training range on the island of Vieques. At its height the military had exclusive possession of about 13 percent of Puerto Rico's territory from which it operated twenty-five military installations (García Muñiz 1991) .
With the onset of the Cold War Puerto Rico was deployed as a potent propaganda tool by the U.S. in its ideological war with the Soviet Union. Puerto Rico was widely promoted as a successful case of democratic economic development in free association with the United States.
Puerto Rico stood in contrast to Cuba, which was portrayed as a communist dictatorship wholly dependent on the Soviet Union for its survival. Puerto Rico also figured prominently in U.S. The Navy department insisted that continued training in Vieques was vital to national security and essential for military preparedness. However, the relentless opposition ultimately convinced the Clinton administration and pro statehood governor Romero Barceló to hold a referendum on continued military use of Vieques (Barreto 2002 , McCaffrey 2002 , Ayala 2011 . But President George Bush abandoned this plan after Romero Barceló's successor, the pro commonwealth governor Silvia Calderon, rejected the agreement. The Navy's rationale for retaining Vieques became untenable when Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz commented that, "Vieques, within a matter of five to 10 years, would be completely obsolete. You cannot train with modern weapons on a World War II training basis" (Shanahan 2002 ).
Bush ordered the Navy to end military training operations in Vieques by May 2003. On March 31, 2004 the Navy Department permanently closed the Roosevelt Roads Naval Base since its primary function was to manage, supply and coordinate military operations in Vieques. The success of the anti-bombing campaign was due in part to the changed strategic situation in the Caribbean after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the erosion of Cuba's economy and political influence. There were simply no military or politically viable challenges to U.S. hegemony in the region. In this context, the naval installations and training facilities were anachronistic relics of an earlier imperial project, not suited to the unipolar status of the United States. All that remains of the sizeable military presence is Fort Buchanan, a 450-acre support base, and a radar surveillance facility in Vieques.
The struggle to remove the Navy from Vieques was an important achievement that affirmed Puerto Rican national identity. However, in economic terms the successful battle for Vieques was ultimately a costly victory. The base closures had a devastating economic impact on southeastern Puerto Rico. The Navy estimated that the Roosevelt Roads naval base employed 2,500 civilian workers and injected $300 million annually to the local economy. Total job losses in the region were estimated at 6,000. In 2016 the unemployment rate was in excess of 17 percent and poverty afflicted about half of the 77,000 residents in the surrounding communities of Fajardo, Ceiba and Naguabo (Cimadevilla 2003) .
After operating the Roosevelt Roads facility for over 60 years, the Navy abandoned the facilities without providing transitional compensation to the localities to mitigate the economic impact of their departure. In 2011, seven years after the base closures, the President's Task Force on the Status of Puerto Rico recommended federal assistance to repurpose Roosevelt Road. The period of greatest growth was between 1960 and 1965 (Ruiz 2016) . By 1970 labor-intensive manufacturing was no longer viable and policy makers promoted the development of oil refining and petrochemical industries (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) . This risky strategy, which was dependent on cheap petroleum pricing, could not be sustained. The third phase The pharmaceutical industry obtained the highest profits of all industry groups because transferred intangible assets to Puerto Rico. In the early 1980s Congress and the Treasury Department reported they were "concerned" that Section 936 would encourage pharmaceuticals to shelter profits earned from drug patents by transferring their income to Puerto Rico (United States General Accounting Office 1992). The Treasury Department accused Section 936 corporations of evading federal taxes, leading to substantial revenue losses for the federal government. The Congressional Research Service reported that the "intangible asset intensive industries" create "relatively few jobs in the possessions" and warned that the number of "jobs created is too small in relation to the tax exemption" (Brumbaugh 2000, 3) . According to the Tax Ricans from virtually the entire political spectrum condemned the proposed PROMESA bill, and many demanded the decolonization of Puerto Rico. Former Governor Aníbal Acevedo Vilá of the PPD, called on the UN to "express its strong condemnation" of the U.S. government for enacting PROMESA because it is "a crude exercise of colonial power…and a unilateral revocation of the restricted powers of self-government that Puerto Rico has achieved" Ricardo Rosello Nevares, gubernatorial candidate of the PNP said, "the creation of a fiscal control board was a plan to limit democracy…. The Special Committee could no longer ignore the fact that Puerto Rico was a colony and should, therefore, be placed on the list of Non-Self-Governing
Territories" (United Nations Special Committee 2016 ). Colonialism promotes, as well as impedes, capitalist expansion (Cabán 2015 According to a senior official at Moody's Analytics, ten years after expiration of Section 936, Puerto Rico's economy was "far and away the weakest of any state in the country. By many measures, including the loss of output, GDP and wealth, it is already suffering a depression.
Even more disconcerting, there is no prospect of the economic slide ending soon (United States.
Senate. Judiciary Committee 2015). The pharmaceutical industry recently acknowledged that
Section 936 had failed to generate employment growth and to make an enduring contribution to Puerto Rico's economy. A decade after the expiration of Section 936, the president of the Puerto Rico-USA foundation, a trade organization that represents the interests of U.S. firms operating in Puerto Rico, expressed his disapproval of the use of federal tax breaks to reactivate the island's economy and emphasized that "the important point here is the fact that the economic model possible as a territory using manufacturing tax breaks has not and will not any longer work." Some economists maintain that federal transfers to individuals helped reduce poverty levels related to the island's high unemployment rates that ranged from 16.9 percent in 2010 to 12.4 percent in 2016. Orlando Sotomayor, found that "poverty has fallen sharply" and that "public transfers played a decisive role in restraining growth in inequality and in reducing poverty levels that were also affected favorably by changes in the distribution of female earned income" (Sotomayor 2004 ). According to James Dietz poverty reduction was not attributable to Operation Bootstrap. Dietz maintains that "poverty decreased because of the growth of federal transfer payments to individuals that compensated for the structural failures of the development program and industrial phasing to reduce the incidence of poverty" (Dietz 2003 166) . what does it take "to make Puerto Rico a better place do to business. You have a set up that makes it difficult for employers to hire" (Briggs 2017 ).
Colonialism imposes the same constraints on policy making for the FMOB as it did for the insular government. A committee established by Puerto Rico's governor in 1975 to study post-recession economic growth strategy concluded that, "We have been regretfully forced to conclude that Puerto Rico has very little scope for financial policies which would insulate the Island from overseas economic and financial developments." The committee, which was chaired by Nobel laureate economist James Tobin, concluded that although Puerto Rico's association with the United States has been "economically advantageous for the Island … some constraints must be acknowledged" (Tobin 1975) .. These same constraints compel FOMB to promote an economic growth model that will attempt remake Puerto Rico into an internationally competitive investment site for U.S. capital. In other words, Operation Bootstrap redux but with austerity.
The amalgamation of foreign capital and cheap domestic labor managed by the federal and insular governments and supplemented with federal transfers, was the basis for capital accumulation since the initial days of U.S. colonial rule. However, the successful reactivation of this type of externally financed growth model is doubtful in the current era of globalization.
The FMOB adopted recommendations of a report commissioned by the Puerto Rican Government Development Bank. The report emphasized that "structural reforms" were necessary "for restoring growth" which is a precondition for restoring Puerto Rico's competitiveness for external capital. The "key" to restoring growth "is local and federal action to lower labor costs gradually and encourage employment" by revising minimum wage, labor laws, and welfare reform. "Local laws that raise input costs should be liberalized and obstacles to the ease of doing business removed" (Krueger, Teja, and Wolfe 2015 ) . David Lachman, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, endorsed the report's recommendation for reducing the "currently high minimum wage" and "reform of federal welfare payments" to make consistent with local conditions. Labor laws should be streamlined to reduce the employment costs and increase labor market flexibility. Lachman called for reform of the "the island's highly uncompetitive market where labor participation is below 40 percent" (Lachman 2017 ).
For decades Puerto Rican officials embraced a growth strategy that conservative economists profess will attract capital and promote growth --"low taxes, few regulations, and low wages" (Reich 2016 December 9) . In 1976 Governor Rafael Hernández Colón testified before a congressional committee that the insular government needed to control wages and environmental policy in order to have "the flexibility needed to regain economic momentum."
Hernández Colón insisted on wage differential for comparable jobs in the U.S. and Puerto Rico.
"The wage differential between Puerto Rico and the United States is very significant in terms of our ability to promote new industry into Puerto Rico." He claimed that the elimination of differential will make "it much more difficult for us to continue to do our job of industrializing Puerto Rico" and told the congressional committee that a low wage is better than no wage.
Teodoro Moscoso, Puerto Rico's economic development administrator was more direct. "The most significant factor in our deteriorating competitive situation has been the rapid increase in labor costs" (Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs 1976, 264, 260) .
Hernández Colón's comments elicited a stern reaction from Congressman Miller. "This is
not what this government is about, to create a class of working poor for some damned industry who wants to violate EPA. I cannot believe you are going to set up this kind of enclave" (363).
The Puerto Rican officials' wage proposal was based on the Tobin committee's recommendation to "hold dollar increases in labor costs in Puerto Rico below the trend in the Mainland" and a salary freezes for government employees. The report recommended adopting a "policy of wage and salary restraint to the private sector." Ultimately the prosperity of business firms is "vitally dependent" on the workers "willingness to accept severe limits on labor cost increases for several years" (Tobin 1975, iv) .
The Krueger report recommendations are strikingly similar to those made by the Tobin committee. Although written over forty years apart, both argue that lower wages increases competitiveness and is an incentive for investment (See Calero 2015) . The notion that wage suppression will spur economic growth is an ineluctable belief of Puerto Rican planners.
According to the Krueger report, economic growth demands extracting greater value from Puerto Rico's working men and women and eliminating social welfare programs that discourage people from entering the labor market. The FMOB has proposed an array of measures to "shock the system" into growth (Krueger 2017) . These measures include deficit reduction, wage controls, reduction in government services, "right sizing" the insular administration, deregulation and privatization. Other revenue generating and cost saving measures include, elimination of Christmas bonus for public sector workers, closing 167 public schools, cuts to the University of Puerto Rico, over 100 percent increases in university tuition and other fees, laying off thousands of public employees, cutting central government subsidies to the municipalities, furloughing public employees of two days per month, eliminating tax incentives and subsidies, and cuts of 10 percent from pensions of retired workers (Quintero 2017) .
The FMOB employs the same austerity measures previously adopted by the PPD and PNP to a failed attempt to increase government revenues ( Ultimately PROMESA reinstates the system of direct colonial administration that preceded the establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 1952. However, the FMOB is unprecedented in the history of U.S. colonial administration. Although the control board is an instrument of the federal government it is authorized to act independently as its surrogate to administer the colony (Cabán 2017a) . Moreover, by creating an ostensibly independent nonpartisan administrative entity comprised of financial and banking experts, the federal government creates the illusion that it is not engaged in the politically charged and contentious debt resolution process. In other words, through an act of prestidigitation Congress transformed a crisis in colonial administration into a debt overhang problem that is subject to resolution by financial technicians. Democratic accountability and economic justice have been sacrificed in order restore solvency and resume the outflow of profits that has been the hallmark of U.S. 
